















The Thesis Committee for John Joseph DiPietro, Jr. 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis: 
 
 



























Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Arts 
 
 




This thesis is dedicated to my grandparents, Guy & Roseanne DiPietro and Joseph 





First, I would like to thank Dr. Bartholomew Sparrow and Dr. Bruce Buchanan 
for helping me with this project; it literally could not have been done without your help, 
and I appreciate everything you have done to help make this project a reality.  I’d also 
like to thank Annette Carlile for answering all the questions I’ve had along the way, and 
all of the faculty at the University of Texas Department of Government for your advice 
and instruction.  My parents, John and LuAnn DiPietro, have been extremely supportive 
as this project came to a conclusion, and for that I thank them more than they can 
possibly know.  To those that helped me understand what I know about politics and 
bonds, I extend my heartiest thanks.  To all my friends, please accept my gratitude for 
standing by me through the trials of this process. 
And finally, I’d like to thank you for reading this.  I hope that it provides some 







POLITICAL CHOICES FOR MUNICIPAL BONDS 
 
John Joseph DiPietro, Jr., M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
Supervisor:  Bartholomew Sparrow 
 
Municipal bonds represent an important but understudied source of funds for 
governments.  This paper seeks to shed light on the previously hidden political choices 
that influence the choices of governments to pursue bonds, as well as to act as a 
springboard for future bond research. 
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 It is no secret that the government requires money to run.  Nor is it a secret that 
the federal government has two main sources of funding – money taken from taxes and 
fees, and money borrowed from people, organizations, and nations in the form of 
government bonds.
1
  The states and local governments add an additional source of 
funding to this list, of course – they receive transfer payments, money given directly from 
the higher levels of government to cover specific projects or types thereof.
2
  However, the 
literature of public policy, public administration, and political science has historically 
understudied the borrowing powers and behaviors of the lower levels of government, 
even in recent years; much of the work done on public finance has been an aspect of 
economics, and fails to focus on the political choices by decision-makers.  While the 
fields of economics and finance study the use of bonds as investment instruments, they 
fail to analyze the decisions that politicians in power make regarding the decision to fund 
projects by borrowing money against the future success of the government in question. 
 This paper aims to collect and disseminate as much information, both from 
existing information and from the author’s own authority, as it can regarding the realities 
of the state and municipal bond* – its purposes, its limits, and comparisons to other 
options, such as taxes.  Beyond that, it seeks to lay the foundations for future research 
into bonds, whether by the author or the efforts of others, by fortifying the thin body of 
research present on the matter. 
                                                 
* It should be noted that municipal bonds are a term used to describe all local government bonds, regardless 
of the government issuing the debt; non-municipal local governments, as described below, are still 
considered to issue “municipal” bonds. 
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 It also seeks to begin addressing a set of specific questions, including the question 
which first inspired this project – Where is the political discretion for lawmakers in 
deciding to use bonds over tax raises?  Where are the decision points, and where is the 
flexibility for the policymakers in the process and in the results of passing bonds versus 
taxes? 
 The Census Bureau estimates that all local governments† in the United States 
collected $900 billion in revenue from their own sources in 2011.  The state governments 
collected an additional $1 trillion in revenue.‡  Much of this money is spent providing 
goods and services to the American people; however, the states also spend $108 billion 
paying back the interest held in general debt – that is to say bonds – of which the local 
governments owe 60%.
3
  The $60 billion paid by local governments exceeds the annual 
budget of any single state except for Illinois, New York, and California.
4
  That same year, 
over $118 billion in new long-term, tax-exempt bonds were also issued by state and local 
governments, ranging from Vermont’s $87 million in bond sales to New York’s $14 
billion in bond proceeds.  In past years, these totals were even greater; in 2007, over $200 
billion in new tax-exempt bonds were issued by state and local governments.
5
 
 As a percentage of available money, bond proceeds are relatively rather small 
compared to tax revenue in a given year; the total amount of bond proceeds in 2011 was 
equal to 5% of the money raised by taxes and charges.  However, this was just one year.  
Debt builds over time, as new principals and new interest are issued year after year.  
                                                 
† Governments subsidiary to the states, as detailed below. 
‡ This excludes the $554 billion granted by state and federal governments to local governments, as well as 
the $573 billion given to the states by the federal government.  This also excludes bond proceeds, which are 




According to one estimate, over three trillion dollars in municipal bond debt remains 
outstanding as for July 2014,
6
 a figure almost equal to President Obama’s federal budget 
request for fiscal year 2014.
7
  We have to ask why governments are willing to put 
themselves into so much debt when they could theoretically just dedicate tax revenue; 
why are they burdening their future populations for projects undertaken in the present. 
 Bonds provide a similar type of flexibility to cities and other local governing 
units.  Bonds often can only be used for particular projects – a city cannot sell a bond to 
pay for employee benefits, but can sell bonds to buy new fixtures and equipment for an 
office.  However, are bonds being used to avoid spending regular revenue – tax money – 
on those other projects, opening up additional funds for purposes that cannot be funded 
by bonds?  What choices are made, and by whom, regarding these decisions?  And what 
are the consequences of the choices these parties make? 
Local Governments 
 For most people, local governments in American federalism refer to the counties 
and the cities of the United States.  This is accurate, but incomplete.  In fact, lower level 
governments, though they vary from state to state, take a great many forms and deal with 
a great many different areas of governance. 
 Cities and counties, which are often responsible for police, utilities, and 
transportation, as well as public works and emergency medical matters, are the best-
known forms of local governments.  However, local governments are any “entity… 
[possessing] existence as an organized entity, governmental character, and substantial 
autonomy.”  This means they must be possessed of “some corporate powers such as… 
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the right to sue and be sued, have a name, make contracts… and the like,” must act in a 
fashion recognized as governing, most importantly providing services to the public or 
being accountable to the populace under the jurisdiction of the entity, and have “fiscal 
and administrative independence” to a notable degree (though they need not be 
completely self-sustaining, as even the states rely heavily upon the federal government 
for money, and must follow the extensive national rules set for them).
8
 
 In addition to county, municipal, and township governments,§ two other types of 
government exist– independent school districts (ISD), and special-purpose governments.  
Although not universal, independent school districts exist in the majority of states,** and 
numbered 12,880 as of the 2012 Census of Governments.
9
 These districts can be 
associated with a particular geographic area defined by the boundaries of cities or 
counties, of course, but the districts themselves have an authority considered separate 
from the local government, and ostensibly do not have to answer to local authorities with 
regards to how the schools are run.
10
 
 Although the concept of special-purpose governments is universal across the 
states, the various functions that can fall under these districts are not.  Each state has the 
right to organize such one-purpose or limited-purpose districts, which can handle a 
common function usually regulated by a local entity which the state has placed under a 
separate authority (i.e. municipal utility districts or transit authorities), or could focus on 
                                                 
§ Township governments do not exist in the South and West regions of the United States, as defined by the 
Census Bureau.  Connecticut and Rhode Island do not have counties. 
** Maryland, North Carolina, and Alaska do not have any independent school districts; they have 
dependent schools based on the municipal or county in question.  Hawaii also has no independent district, 
and operates a single state-run school system.  Sixteen states have a mix of the two types, ranging from 




a novel purpose conceived of in that state (i.e. mosquito abatement) which is not 
traditionally a government task, but which the state chose to involve itself in for the 
betterment of the people.  These districts are also the most varied in geographic control; 
although some serve areas based on cities or counties in the same fashion as local ISDs, 
some of them are in charge of a larger, less defined region.
11
 
 We require these definitions because local governments can and often do receive 
differential treatment based on their type and size.  A narrowly-tailored special district 
may have more or stricter restrictions under the law than larger multi-purpose 
governments such as cities and counties. 
Data on Bonds 
 Major works on public administration, urban politics, and political science barely 
mention bonds, if they do so at all.  A 2001 work on comparative public administration 
does not mention bonds, even with regards to national issues.
12
  The most recent edition 
of the Urban Politics Reader mentions bonds as an option for satisfying the “imperative 
for an urban regime [to secure] sufficient revenues,”
13
 but no details are given regarding 
the actual effects of bond purchases on political fortunes or on practical realities of urban 
politics.  Another major 2007 work similarly excludes mention of debt or bonds,
14
 and 
the regularly-updated online Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics has no entries for 
“debt,” “bonds,” “municipal bonds,” or other related terminology.
15
  The state of data 
available regarding bonds and bond issues may contribute to the neglect of the issue. 
 The IRS provides one major source of bond information.  Given the tax-exempt 
status of many types of government bonds, the IRS keeps track of bond issuances, and 
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provides aggregate data regarding the different types of bonds, divided by state and by 
purpose for the bond; this data includes both the number of issuances,†† as well as the 
amounts issued overall.  However, the data’s organization only focuses on the states’‡‡ 
aggregate principal amounts issued in a given year, without aggregating principal 
amounts across time, interest due in a given year, or disaggregating the data between the 
state and local governments.  In addition, the data only dates back to the 1990s, and in 
many cases includes aggregation of principals across many years; prior to 2005, at least 
some, if not all, of the data comes as a total of all bonds issued in a multiyear timeframe, 
making it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish cross-year trends prior to that date.
16
 
The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, a subsidiary agency to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, runs the Electronic Municipal Market Access 
(EMMA) online bond database, which presents a great deal more detail about specific 
bonds themselves; it provides information about any and all outstanding bonds from all 
government issuers across the nation, including issuing dates, rates, and trade activity, as 
well as any official statements issued about the bonds, primarily as a resource for 
investors and potential issuing governments.  As a result of the investor-based focus, the 
site lacks detailed classifications for each type of issuer; that is, there is no way to search 
simply for school districts, special districts, or county governments if one was so 
inclined.  The primary search feature works off of the issuing government’s name, likely 
due to the sites professed focus on providing information to investors (and to issuers who 
                                                 
†† An issuance being a single government’s issuing of bonds for a single purpose, not the number of bonds 
issued overall. 
‡‡ Including the local governments in a given state. 
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are curious as to the financial conditions of comparable governments), and the advanced 
features only offer limited options for filtering specific types of data; nor does the sight 
provide any aggregation mechanisms.  Finally, the site appears to either not keep records 
once the bond has been paid off, or else lacks data from before a certain point; especially 
if the latter is the case, using the individual entries to build a research database may well 
leave holes in the data that can thwart analysis.  Having said that, the EMMA database 
provides comprehensive information for those who wish to study specific issuers’ current 
debts, either academically or as an investor; individual queries such as these will find 
EMMA to be a highly useful tool.
17
 
 Some states provide better bond information than others; however, Texas is the 
only state to compile its own comprehensive database for both state and local bonds.  The 
Texas Bond Review Board (BRB) maintains an in-state database similar to EMMA on 
bond issuances divided by government.  Unlike EMMA, the database can be broken 
down by government type; one can easily find out how much money the school districts 
or city governments owe.  However, it runs into a similar problem regarding past entries 
– bonds that have passed their maturity date by more than a year, or which have been 
otherwise paid off, are removed from the system; thus, there is no way to use the database 
to create a complete picture of bond issuances in state history.
18
 
 Private sources provide other forms of information; investment companies 
advertising bonds, as well as financial analysts, provide sale prices, interest rates, and 
other useful data to investors.  However, that data is aimed just there – at investors.  No 
known company maintains a comprehensive list of publically available bond information.  
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Think tanks and other analysis sites provide summary statistics about aggregate bond 
figures, such as the total outstanding bond debt,
19
 but no site provides specific 
information as well as EMMA or the Texas BRB. 
 Quantitative data is not the only aspect of bond information that lacks a complete 
centralized and standardized database; no agency maintains a comprehensive list of state 
and local bond policies.  While the MSRB does maintain its national rules, the MSRB 
site lacks information about how local policies vary from state to state; to understand 
state policies, researchers must delve into state constitutions and statutes to understand 
what policies and rules each state abides by.
20
  This, in turn, makes the bond process 
virtually opaque to those outside of it – while voters see a piece of the process in their 
elections (as described below), insight into the pre-bond process becomes scarce and 
diffuse.  No known academic insight into how decisions to pursue bonds exists. 
 Similarly, comprehensive data on how each state regulates its local governments 
remains lacking.  Although the Census Bureau provides information about the different 
local governments across the country, updated every five years, the report provides only 
general information about the powers and purposes of each type of government, and fails 
to address specific details regarding tax and bond limits.  This makes it difficult to 
generalize about the options available to specific types of governments.
21
 
 All of these sources provide valuable information; however, many are also 
designed to service investors, not political scientists or policy analysts, possibly 
contributing to the lack of non-economic research into the politics of bonds, and the 
political decisions that influence whether to raise money through bonds, or to raise it 
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through taxes.  As a result, political research into bond issues cannot rely upon specific 
quantitative data; instead, it must rely on a qualitative approach that determines where in 
the process lawmakers generally have discretion and decision points. 
Bond Qualities 
 Although states can have special classes or qualifications for bonds, there are a 
few commonalities between the various types of bonds issued by states and 
municipalities.  First of all, bonds have some federal regulation: the Municipal Securities 
Review Board acts to qualify advisors and underwriters, and reports information on local 
and state government debt to investors through their EMMA database;
22
 the IRS makes 
sure that the governments spend the money they raise on public projects in a certain time-
table.
23
  However, each state has the right to handle most bond issues as it sees fit; no 
federal laws require bond elections, and so long as the bonds operate within the bounds of 
the IRS laws, the federal government largely stays out of state and local public finance 
issues. The exceptions are private activity bonds – issued by municipalities and states to 
raise money for projects undertaken with a non-government profit-making entity – which 
are taxable at the federal level,
24
 and tax credit bonds, which are generally issued based 
on federal legislation and act as a federal income tax credit rather than a direct investment 
(though the states affected are actually issuing the bonds).
25
   
Each state has some form of bond regulation, usually as part of the constitution.  
In the case of Texas and Delaware, all public security issuance must be approved by the 
Office of the Attorney General, and the information on these approvals is collected by the 
Texas Bond Review Board, an agency nominally consisting of the Governor and several 
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other high ranking individuals in Texas government who prepare annual reports 
regarding local debt.  On a more passive level, state laws in Texas restrict bond issuance 
to an extent by setting a limit on the amount of property tax that may be used to fund 
bond repayment.  However, within these constraints, those bodies which can issue bonds 
are able to issue them for any public works project they feel necessary, and all other 
states have similar policies regarding how bonds can be used.
 26
 States such as Alabama
27
 
and Illinois allow for local governments to seek bonds via election, but have very specific 
rules on how much debt a given government can accrue. 
 Though each state has its own policies, the IRS has determined three main 
specific classes of bonds.  Tax-exempt bonds are both the oldest and the most common.  
These bonds fall into two categories: the more common, referred to as general obligation 
or “GO” bonds, are issued in order to raise capital for projects within a specific issue 
area, such as education or transportation; and the less-commonly used certificates of 
participation (COP), where a government “leases” a capital project using existing 
revenue, as opposed to allowing any new taxes, and which can be canceled at any 
time.
28§§  The bonds act as a loan made by the purchaser, with the promise that it will be 
worth more in a specified length of time than when it was purchased, and that the 
investment and interest will be free from federal taxation.***  The money raised in the 
sales falls into two categories: new money is used towards a novel project (i.e. newly 
                                                 
§§ Though no federal laws require elections for any bond, most states require that municipal GO bonds 
undergo an election before sale; COPs can be issued without elections, as they do not raise taxes and are 
paid from pre-existing revenue, and because they can be discontinued if the government allows it. 
*** The Federal Government does have the Constitutional authority to tax bond interest payments, 
according to the 1988 case South Carolina v. Baker.  However, federal law has codified the tax-free nature 
of tax-exempt bond interest.  Each state is allowed to regulate such interest as taxable income for its own 
purposes, if its legislature wishes. 
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announced school renovations); refunding bonds, on the other hand, appear to be used to 
help pay back older bonds which are coming due (similar to using one credit card with 
low interest to pay off another with higher interest, or more accurately, similar to 
refinancing a loan under better terms).
 29
 
 The second category of bond is the private activity bond, mentioned above.  
These bonds can vary in purpose as well, but typically involve some sort of private 
enterprise or endeavor, which the backing city or state nevertheless considers beneficial 
to the community;
30
 they also can be used in situations where there is a public-private 
partnership.
31
  The interest rates on these bonds are taxable, but the rates tend to be 
higher; in an ideal situation for the investor, the bonds will pay back as much as, if not 
more, than a tax-exempt bond of similar value over a similar time.
 32
 
 Finally, governments occasionally issue tax-credit bonds.  Unlike tax-exempt and 
private activity bonds, which are intended to provide interest payments upon the 
maturation of the bond, tax credit bonds allow the bearer to claim a specified value from 
the bond as a tax credit every year they hold the bond.  These bonds are relatively novel, 
however, dating to only 1997,
 33
 (compared to municipal bonds, which were first issued 
in 1812 by New York City)
34
 and are the smallest category, both in number of offerings 
(less than 200 separate offerings in 2010) and in dollar value (only $1 billion in 2010, 
compared to the $420 billion in tax-exempt bonds the same year).
35
  They also are the 
most limited, as each bond relates to a highly specific activity, such as school 
construction, forest conservation or renewable energy, instead of more general issue areas 
such as transportation.  These also are tied into the federal government, which grants 
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permission to issue tax credit bonds (though in theory states could issue them 
independently to exempt individuals from state income tax, as well).
36
 
 Governments may have only one option for types of bonds to use, or may possess 
several; however, all bonds of a given type function similarly regardless of the issuer.  A 
general obligation bond issued by a school district does not possess unique characteristics 
compared to a GO bond from a city with comparable taxing policies; state bond issuances 
are likely larger than an individual city’s issuances, and states and cities obviously have 
different sizes of tax bases, but a state transportation bond and a local transportation bond 
will ultimately function to accomplish the same thing, and will ultimately be paid off the 
same way. 
Choices Between Bonds 
  The types of issuable bonds presents one form of choice to lawmakers – 
depending on the circumstances they find themselves in, they may have one or many 
options to raise capital through bonds.  Thus, the choice for governments seeking debt for 
capital projects comes down to which type of bond would be most appropriate. 
 In most situations where a private entity makes a profit, or where revenue is 
generated, revenue and public activity bonds are usually the only option.  However, in the 
event that a municipality somehow had the choice between revenue bonds and GO bonds, 
which option would they pick?  For example, in the 2011 Central Health bond offering, 
part (but not all) of the bonded project provided revenue to a private entity which co-
owned the facility being financed; if the hospital district had the choice to work with a 
partner and seek the revenue bond, or to use the same amount of money in a general 
13 
 




 Assuming such a situation could exist under the law, the ultimate answer likely 
depends on three factors: how much additional money the private entity could provide, 
how much revenue the private portion of the bond would generate, and how popular the 
project is.  In the first place, if a private entity working on the bonds is willing to stake a 
certain amount of money, the extra revenue may entice the government to work with 
them to fund the project, even though the bonds will be taxed and thus may be less 
appealing to investors.  Secondly, the revenue that the bond’s projects generate affect the 
likelihood the bond can be paid off in time; if the projected revenue edges too close to 
what the bond would need in order to pay itself off, GO bonds may prove to be a more 
appropriate choice; this is especially true if the bonds can be made for a shorter term, 
meaning that any tax increases associated with the bond could be redirected in the future. 
 Finally, and most importantly, governments must take into account popularity of 
the project being bonded.  This issue also comes up in the choice between certificates of 
participation and general obligation bonds; although the latter has fewer funding sources 
(since taxes cannot be raised to pay off COPs), according to financial advisors, COPs 
provide funding in situations where the projects are unpopular with voters, and thus stand 
a high chance of losing in an election.  Prisons, administrative buildings, and other 
projects voters see as unnecessary or even dangerous, but which government see or know 





 Governments also must decide how much debt to take on at a time, and what the 
time-table for paying the bonds back will be.  With regards to the first, the decision 
comes down to whether or not the government should sell all available bonds at once or 
not, which in turn largely depends on the state of the market.  Interest rates across bonds 
tend to vary consistently; a low-grade bond may have a higher interest rate than a highly-
rated bond, but the same type of bond will generally see its interest rates rise or fall at the 
same pace, meaning that all municipalities should have similar sale prospects, time being 
irrelevant.
39
  Given this, it generally behooves a the government to sell when interest 
rates are low; a difference in one percentage point of interest can cost the city 
$10,000,000 in additional interest on a fifteen-year bond.  In situations where the rate is 
higher than the government would like, the government is more likely to sell bonds over 
time as needed, in hopes that the rates may go down, or at least that the delay will prevent 
the debt from coming due all at once, giving extra time to pay it off. 
 Governments also have control over the duration of the bonds, which can be an 
important tool in deciding how the debt affects the area’s economic prospects.  
Sometimes, as in the case of Central Health, bonds are structured to come due at the same 
time, fifteen years after issuance.  This may be as a result of the hospital district’s 
financial health, or may be a factor of the “simple” structure of the project in question.
40
  
Alternatively, a complicated school bond or other multi-layered issue may stagger the 
debt over many years; according to one school trustee involved in a recent bond election, 
certain items are funded by different length bonds, depending on the life of the item and 
the need for funds.  A thirty-year bond may be ideal for a long-lasting school structure, 
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but would be less appropriate for a set of computers that will likely be obsolete and 
require replacement in eight years. 
The State of Municipal and State Bond Debt 
 Nationally, almost sixteen thousand bonds tax-exempt were issued in 2010 alone 
by states and municipal divisions, which raised a total of $217 billion dollars.
41
  Over half 
of the money was allotted for refunding purposes.
42
  The IRS divides the remaining new 
money bonds into nine categories.  Seven of the categories are specific issue areas: 
education, health (including hospitals), transportation, public safety, environment, 
housing, and utilities.†††  Area 8 includes anticipation notes, short-term (one year 
maturation period) bonds which are issued to cover high start-up costs and which are paid 
out of the following year’s taxes, bonds, or general revenues.  The final area is a 
miscellaneous category, in the event that a bond did not clearly fit into the above areas, or 
that the bond’s issue area was not clear (either due to a lack of reporting or due to falling 
into multiple issue areas).
43
 
 As previously mentioned, the state and local governments paid over $100 million 
in interest and returns on principals in 2011.
44
  However, the vast fluctuations in interest 
rates across time make it impossible to tell how principle was outstanding that year; 
average interest rates in the last six years alone have varied from 2.5% at the beginning of 
2013 for highly-rated bonds to nearly 8% for lower rated bonds in 2009.  In addition, 
these figures only reflect 20-year bonds issued in this time; longer or shorter terms may 
carry adjustments to the interest rate to incentivize bonds of different length.
45
 
                                                 
††† These are federal classifications.  The states and cities may use their own categories, but most bond 
funding falls into one of these seven areas. 
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How Are Bonds Passed? 
 Certain types of bonds require no voter approval; other types of bonds may, 
depending on state and local laws.  Understanding the process by which these types of 
bonds come into being helps us understand the choices lawmakers have in passing bonds.  
In both cases, the process, on the surface, seems relatively simple. 
 All bonds start with the governing body in question.  It is up to that body, be it a 
city council, school board, or state legislature, to determine whether or not a bond is a 
necessary and proper instrument to secure additional funding beyond taxes, fees, and 
fines already in place.  From there, the process diverges depending on the type of bond, 
or, rather, the rules in place for the type of bond being debated.  For those bonds that 
require only approval from the government, such as revenue bonds and GO bonds in 
specific locations (generally only the states, though some local governments have more 
freedom in this area), the government can choose to pass them without consulting voters, 
giving some of these choices more attractiveness. 
 For GO bonds in most governments, approval of the bond legislation leads to the 
bond being placed on the ballot, either in the next election period where matters 
pertaining to that government would be voted upon, or with a special election.  For 
example, Georgia law sets the dates that special elections can be held.
46
  Texas’ Election 
Code similarly sets dates, but has a number of override options that can allow for 
alternative election dates.
47
   
The dates available for elections affect the choices open to lawmakers, as 
different electoral situations provide different conditions for a bond’s victory.  A more 
17 
 
conservative crowd in odd-year elections may favor fire and police bonds, but limit the 
success of other issues; however, even-year elections tend to be more crowded, not only 
with bonds but with other issues as well, meaning that some items may receive “no” 
votes due to choice fatigue, especially those that are placed later on the ballot.
48
  
Similarly, the timing of a bond election within a year, if such an option exists, affects the 
electorate, as well.  If the state allows bond elections to occur with primaries, this can 
lead to skewed electoral support, as turnout is lower and tends to be more partisan, 
leading to more extreme reactions to a particular proposal.
49
  Knowing the current trends 
for elections may change when a particular election is scheduled, if the option is available 
to a lawmaker. 
 Once the bond is approved by either the governing body or the voters, the bond is 
sold, and the money is put to work on projects.  Governments do have a certain amount 
of flexibility in determining how the bonds are sold (i.e. all at once or over time), and in 
determining the length of a given bond’s maturation period (allowing them to sell bonds 
for smaller projects so that they can come due at a more appropriate time).
50
  The selling 
government then arranges to pay back the bond over a set length of time using tax 
dollars. 
The Process, Revised 
The above process portrays how bonds are brought to fruition: a ballot measure is 
proposed; a ballot measure passes; the government receives proceeds that it must later 
pay back.  However, ballots only have so much room; they cannot place the entire text of 
the bond offering on the pages, and thus most voters only see a summary of the bond, 
18 
 
including the principal amount and the general purpose.  However, what goes into a new 
bond election before it reaches the ballot? 
 A given local government does initiate the formal process of determining whether 
or not to offer a bond election; however, this process starts up to two years before the 
election would take place.  In the cases of governments that have multiple areas of 
responsibility – such as a city, which can seek bonds on multiple subject matters such as 
housing or transportation – the government’s lawmakers also must decide what topics to 
support with a bond; in single issue area districts, such as independent school districts, 
the bond can be structured to include any desired education-related capital expenses.  
After the decision to seek a bond is made, the given governing body – a school board, 
city council, board of trustees, or other organization or authority based on the 
government’s structure – then has to determine how much to seek in the election.  To do 
so, that board must solicit funding requests from those that would be affected by the 
bond.  This can take many forms, as well, from public polling to asking those in charge of 
a particular unit (such as a hospital department head or a school principal) to list their 
individual needs.  In addition, governments must consult the contractors that would be 
responsible for completing such developments, in order to acquire cost estimates, design 
plans, determine the likely placement of new construction, and other related information 
vital to the construction.   
All of this information comes at a cost –the money collected by architects and 
other cost estimators might not be refunded to the city if the election fails, which can 
affect how detailed a bond package is before an election; governments may choose to 
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limit pursuing complete or fully detailed plans (so much as the law provides) until a bond 
has passed the voters, in order to save money.
51
 
 When the data in question has been gathered, as a best practice, the governing 
body designs a “blueprint” of how the money to be raised should be spent by issue 
priority.  This does not expressly have to happen in every case; however, these blueprints 
allow for a firm understanding of what changes or developments need to be made, and 
allow the government in question to make sure that they seek the right amount by 
analyzing the government’s needs, and are generally considered a best practice.
52
  This 
also allows a given district to make sure that all the changes desired by those involved are 
actually necessary and desirable, and that the process assigns proper importance to given 
issues.   
Once the actual plans have been drawn up, districts employ special firms to 
examine the wish lists and design the actual bond packages that will be offered, including 
any additional funds necessary to act as a “cushion” against overruns.  These packages 
also outline the sale patterns of bonds, determining how quickly to sell them and the 
denominations (both in dollar values and in the maturation period) based on the money 
spent on particular improvements, the performance of past bond sales, and the 
government’s current debt situation and repayment rate.  Again, these financial advisors 
come at a cost, which may or may not be refunded or recouped if the bond fails 
(depending on the negotiations between the parties).  These plans also take into account 
the window over which the funds will be distributed.  Only after these plans have been 





 From there, the process does continue largely as described previously – after the 
call for an election (if one is required), a period of public response opens up, allowing for 
campaigns for and against a bond.  Unlike with candidate positions, the bonds cannot be 
altered based on public demand; also unlike candidates, the body that initially called for 
an election may not be able to defend it themselves.  Laws vary from state to state, but in 
many cases the originating government cannot distribute material or make political 
communications in support of or against a proposed package; nor can any member of that 
board speak out for or against a bond package in an official capacity (as a private citizen, 
they may make such comments on an individual basis, but they cannot claim their 
membership in that government in the process).  The governments so limited can 
distribute informational material that expressly explains what the bonds will be used for, 
but cannot make statements that endorse the election; special law firms are retained to 
examine the language of any material or communication distributed in such cases. 
 After a successful election, the bonds are distributed as per the plan, though many 
plans do allow for some flexibility if the situation has changed since initial development.  
At this point, the state employs an underwriter, who may have been chosen before the 
bond sale.  The underwriter assumes the financial risk for government and purchases all 
the bonds offered at designated times, then distributes the bonds to investors.
54
  The 
interest rate plays a key role in such sales, as it determines whether all the bonds are sold 
at once (if the rate is low), or whether the bonds will be broken up and sold piecemeal as 
needed.  Once the bonds are sold, the funds are allocated as per the plans’ priorities, until 





 On the surface, this version of events seems to reflect a similar, if more detailed, 
process as the one described earlier.  However, these details, which the public must 
actively seek beyond the voting booth, actually open all-new understandings of what 
bond sales mean to local governments, and how much flexibility they may provide.  In 
fact, in conjunction with other research on various stages of the process, bonds may 
provide flexibility for governments, but not fungibility.  Bond sales only provide that as 
an afterthought. 
 As mentioned before, bond packages include a certain amount of contingency 
funding, in the event that a particular project runs over estimation for any reason.  The 
constitutional provisions in a given state may allow for left-over funds to be used for 
similar purposes at a later date, if the initial package has been met; for instance, if a new 
school was completed with exactly 100% of the budget, the leftover contingency money 
could be used by for other educational capital expenditures.  This is not always the case – 
in California, the state’s Fourth District Court of Appeals ruled that elections passed 
under a 55% threshold‡‡‡ cannot use money for projects not listed on the bond offering
56
 - 
but most state and local governments can use money for general purposes after fulfilling 
any specifically listed projects (and the language in both bond offerings and ballot 
measures often include clauses that allow for flexible spending).  Thus, an efficient-
enough project leaves room for spending on other matters, and the choice to proceed with 
a bond may depend on the reliability of particular contractors. 
                                                 
‡‡‡ California allows for several different types of voting thresholds for different purposes, the three most 
common being simple majority, 55% of voters, and 2/3 of voters. 
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 However, several key limits prevent this funding from being spent arbitrarily, and 
in fact prevent it from being raised arbitrarily, as well.  The largest such limit comes from 
arbitrage laws, a set of federal tax codes that regulate when a bond can be considered tax 
free.  Federal law largely does not concern itself with the design and implementation of 
bond sales; however, given the nature of general obligation bonds to be tax-exempt, the 
IRS and Congress have instituted a set of rules and laws to determine under what 
conditions bonds are not subject to taxation.  These rules are another reason that bond 
lawyers and investment firms play such a crucial role in the process; if bonds were not 
tax exempt, there is a good chance that would-be buyers would rather invest in other 
matters.  One major component of the laws regulates how much money raised from a 
bond sale must be spent by a particular time. As a rule, 85% of the money raised in a 
bond sale must be spent within five years.
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 This number is key.  Arbitrage laws make no mention about contingency funding; 
they do not prevent localities from including it as part of a package, but neither do they 
formally recognize it as somehow exempt.  That means that a particular municipality or 
local government can seek, at most, to make fifteen percent of the total bond sale a “slush 
fund” from which they can draw money for other capital projects in the long run without 
another bond election.  And, that number requires exact expenditures on the bonds’ stated 
purposes, without overrun, and (in the event of an overly-efficient contractor) enough 
other projects to pay for in the short run in order to prevent the bond’s tax-exempt status 
from being removed.
58
  Thus, bond-offering governments must consider how much 
construction they reasonably can perform in a given timespan when constructing a bond-
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package; projects that are not expected to begin within five years, or whose construction 
time will take them past the five-year mark from the bond sale, may remain off the table 
until a later year, when a new bond can be passed. 
 This does allow some room for leftover bond money to sit and wait until the 
government needs it; should any of the contingency funds not be necessary, they can be 
held onto until spent so long as 85% of the original bond was expended, as per federal 
law.  In the event of a future failed election, leftover bond money can be used to 
accomplish some of the smaller requests of a given bond, so long as it falls in the same 
purpose (e.g. you cannot use transportation funding on a low-income housing project, but 
you can use it to fix potholes that a large transportation bond would have fixed).  
However, that also means that the contingency funds may not be available as a “slush 
fund” should the project go over budget – the original purpose of the contingency funds 
is to act as a buffer in the event the projects need more money than expected, and thus 
must first be dedicated to those original projects before they can be spent on something 
else.  In extreme cases, a bond’s funds may run out before the project is even complete; 
though no cases of this were located, lawmakers obviously feel some concern about this 
prospect, or contingency funds would not be necessary in the first place. 
 Also, there is a question as to how fungible the money truly is.  This paper works 
on the idea that money is fungible when one source earmarks funding for a particular 
project, allowing general funds to be redistributed to other purposes.  The fungibility of 
bonds must take into account how tax revenue can be spent at a local level.  Local 
budgets consist of two components – a portion used to pay off bonded debt (including 
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principles and interest), and the maintenance and operations (M&O) component, which 
pays salaries and handles all other expenses.
5960
 
Tax money can be put towards any purpose in the M&O; unless a law passing a 
new tax specifically earmarks that tax money for some specific purpose, tax money can 
be allocated to any project.  Bond proceeds, conversely, must be put towards capital 
expenditures.  One cannot pay salaries with bonds, or buy supplies intended to be used up 
such as paper or printer ink.
61
  However, in the absence of bond money, it is the M&O 
funding that provides for smaller capital goods, on a “pay-as-you-go” basis – replacement 
computer and printer purchases, capital repairs and replacements, and other such items all 
drain tax dollars.  A bond can provide for new computing equipment, and while it cannot 
be used to repair malfunctions, it can be used to replace existing infrastructure with new 
items that will malfunction less frequently than the old unit. 
 Thus, bond funding can be somewhat fungible in the long run in particular 
circumstances, and the presence of funds from a bond can provide fungibility in the 
M&O budget.  However, lawmakers cannot fully rely on the possibility; though 
knowledge of contractors and situations may allow governing bodies some idea as to how 
much will probably be left over from a successful bond whose projects are all completed, 
uncontrollable factors such as the weather and the price of supplies can lead to cost 
overruns that prevent the accumulation of excess bond funding.  Further, they cannot 
count on bond elections passing automatically; thus, they cannot rely on money from a 
bond alleviating the burden on their budgets caused by old or damaged equipment. 
Why Policymakers Use Bonds Instead of Taxes 
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 One of the questions raised earlier in the paper dealt with the question as to why 
the local governments choose to sell bonds when they can instead tax their constituents.  
Certainly, there are political concerns, but the mechanics certainly exist to raise taxes if 
necessary.  However, the reality of the situation is that, while taxes are certainly more 
flexible than bonds in what they can be used for, there are other limits in place that keep 
tax money from being a panacea to government spending woes. 
 When looking at local governments as a whole – city governments as well as 
other local bodies such as school boards – property taxes make up a large portion of 
revenue.  At both the city and state level in 2010, property taxes made up an aggregate 
35% of all revenue, with sales tax coming in second place at 34%, making property taxes 
the largest revenue source for state and local governments.
62
  However, for many local 
governments, property tax may be the only source of revenue, depending on local tax 
laws; for most localities, it likely is the most important in terms of percentage of revenues 
and raw dollar values.  Thus, whenever outside forces limit property tax rates in some 
fashion, they limit the ability of the local government to collect the vast majority of their 
revenues. 
 The vast majority of states impose some limit on how much property tax can be 
collected by local governments – in fact, forty-six out of fifty states imposed some 
manner of restriction.
63
  These can come in a variety of forms and sizes, varying from 
state to state, but the two that appear most common involve limiting either the rate of 
taxation or the amount of tax revenue a given tax can generate.  For example, Texas 
school districts are limited to a specific rate of taxation – no district can impose a 
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property tax greater than 50 cents per $100 of assessed value.
64
  This can also be 
rewritten as $5 per $1000 of assessed value – an expression referred to as a millage rate 
(with one mil being a tenth of a percent).
65
  In Texas’ case, this is a simple rate limit.  
Regardless of how the property values change, the school districts are able to impose a 
flat rate on property values, but cannot exceed this value (unless special permission is 
somehow granted or the law changes).  This also does not mean that every district must 
operate at that rate, and many can operate under this limit; however, taxes that exceed 
this limit can only come from override votes by the people.
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 Another type of limit, one that constrains states far more, comes in the form of an 
increase limit.  In the state of Washington, for example, local governments cannot 
normally collect more than 1% more revenue than in the previous year.  This does not 
apply on an individual level, but is spread out over the entire tax base; however, this limit 
does constrain Washington localities in how much they can count on from year to year.  
Override mechanisms exist, such as by popular election, but these also cannot be counted 
upon.
67
  Thus, Washington exists in a state of incrementalism – the state’s local 
governments cannot exceed certain limits from year to year, and thus need to maintain a 
certain degree of equilibrium in how much they take in AND how much they spend.  
Under the original Taxpayer Bill of Rights amendment, Colorado governments at all 
levels returned $2 billion in excess taxes above the constitutional limits to taxpayers, 
either directly or through lowering future tax bills, when collected revenue exceeded the 





 In addition to revenue limits, states can limit how much their localities are able to 
spend from revenue sources.  In some cases, this forces additional funding into rainy day 
funds; in other cases, this can even require the rebate of revenue to taxpayers (especially 
with regards to property tax).  This means that a given government can be certain in how 
much money they will have to spend from year to year (assuming the economy remains 
the same), but also means they know that they have nothing left to fall back upon if 
expenses suddenly skyrocket; when we consider that localities probably have to also have 
some kind of contingency funding (i.e. extra money for city vehicles in case the price of 




 Coordination issues also provide problems with regards to taxes.  Most parts of 
the country report to multiple local entities for different things, and thus pay different 
taxes to each body in addition to state and local income taxes.  Keeping the schools 
separate from the water district, the hospital district, and the general oversight of the city 
government may allow the school district more latitude to make decisions without having 
to report to a less informed bureaucracy; however, it also means that the school in 
question must compete with the other forms of local government for resources.  Each 
additional division between different components of government means that taxation 
policy is similarly fragmented; this means that local politicians in a particular government 
must consider other, overlapping local taxes when considering raising their own. 
 For example, in the thirty largest metropolitan areas of the United States, the 
average median home price to median income ratio is 3:1; now, this is obviously possible 
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due to mortgages, allowing people to buy homes over time rather than pay for it all at 
once.  However, property taxes are not figured in to mortgage payments; owning a home 
in a relatively expensive city can become even more expensive when you have to pay a 
portion of that home’s value annually.
70
  Now imagine that four or more separate entities 
are taxing out money from homeowners each year, without any centralized control.  This 
can quickly get out of hand if all of the local governments tax at the highest rate 
permissible, depending on how high those limits are, especially for those homeowners 
who make less than the median income.   
Even if the rate limits are somehow designed to prevent the tax burden from 
becoming too high to actually manage, having multiple localities with high tax rates may 
prevent the tax base from growing by discouraging people from moving into the area, and 
new taxes may drive away those who would pay them.  For instance, in New Jersey, a 
state-wide “millionaire’s tax” instituted in 2004 was estimated by the state to have 
contributed to 20,000 additional individuals leaving the state.  While that number would 
not normally be a cause for concern, given the wealth of the individuals in question this 
cost the state about $2.5 billion in revenue, something the report considered “small but 
significant,”
71
 and offsetting the revenue boost that the tax actually brought in.  Further, 
the study also contended that similar effects in other states would lead to similar effects 
internally – increasing marginal tax rates can lead to an offset in revenue as the tax base 
moves away, and there is no way to account for how many people and businesses such 
taxes will keep out of the state (and hypothetically city) in question in the future.
72
  Thus, 
local governments must be careful even when their proposed taxes do not exceed the 
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limits set for them, so as not to create situations where potential taxpayers choose to 
avoid living in a given area.  To that end, lawmakers may seek to use bonds to avoid 
large tax increases that could drive away current and potential residents, while 
simultaneously improving the quality of the governed area to further entice newcomers. 
Finally, these limits are not equally applied to all governments.  Texas is one of 
the states that limits how high the tax rates can be in a municipality or special district.  
However, counties are exempt from state limitations on taxes, allowing them a greater 
deal of flexibility in how they structure their tax packages.  This can be encouraging for 
investors in county bonds in Texas, since the taxing power guarantees a return on 
investment.  Depending on how much the county governments need to do, however, they 
may be able to set the rates so high that school districts and cities in the same area cannot 
raise their taxes high enough for their own purposes.
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Why Use Bonds? 
 Given the restrictions of bonds, why would a government choose to pursue 
bonded debt as an alternative to taxation?  Certainly, some projects are too large to fund 
out of a given year’s tax base without cuts elsewhere, but when funding smaller, revenue-
fundable projects, why do governments find bonds more acceptable than tax hikes?§§§ 
 One possible reason is perception.  Tax increases are not popular policies, 
particularly in the eyes of those who would pay them.  Although Gallup finds support for 
raising taxes on the rich, overall opinion trends favor lowering taxes in general across the 
nation, even if it means a cut in services; in addition, those polled reported a personal 
                                                 
§§§ We should also note that some bond packages include raising the taxes as part of the plan to pay for 
them.  However, these increases tend to be smaller than the taxes needed to fund a project without bonds. 
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sensation that the current income tax is too high for them.
74
  Furthermore, though 
questions regarding property taxes across the nation are not asked often, local property 
taxes are generally regarded as the most onerous and the least fair – in 2005, a Gallup 
poll on the matter suggested that twice as many people saw their property tax as the worst 
tax they had to pay than thought their income tax was the least fair.
75
  This perception has 
a long history in the United States; similar numbers can be found in research conducted 
in the 1970s by the federal government, with the opinions then being discussed as 
nationwide, with far less variation based on location than expected.
76
  
Also, since you can only use bonds for capital projects, many of which are 
designed to last a long time, bonds carry a perception of fairness – those who live in the 
community now are not forced to pay for items they may not enjoy the full life of, and 
those that come into a community are able to pay their “fair share” of projects that were 
started before their arrival.
77
  This may be especially true in cities and states where voter 
approval is required to pass either a bond or a tax increase; whether this it due to a state 
law requiring such a vote in all cases (such as Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights 
Amendment)
78
 or because the government in question would exceed the limits set by the 
state (such as when Central Health held an election which increased property taxes to 
double the constitutional limit),
79
 local governments may seek to issue a bond which 
includes a modest tax increase rather than ask voters to approve a large tax hike. 
 Given such opinion against property taxes, which are the main source of funding 
for local governments, it makes sense that the governments in question would seek to 
minimize the local tax burden as much as possible, or at least avoid raising it noticeably 
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to pay for projects.  And yet, when it remains one of, if not the, biggest sources of 
revenue for state and local government, this limits the options available to those local 
governments in question.
80
  Thus, bonds may provide the ability to avoid openly raising 
taxes to the level necessary to pay for a project, even if such tax revenue is an option.  
This is especially important in situations where the government in question has to call for 
elections to support new taxes as well as new bonds – bonds may be an easier sell to 
voters, even if in the long run they become more expensive than raising the tax would 
have been. 
 Bonds also may be sought in times when they are not necessary to help prepare 
for times when they are.  In 2011, Central Health, a recently-created local government in 
Travis County, sought taxable revenue bonds for a set of construction projects to help 
build new facilities and renovate existing ones, despite the presence of existing reserve 
funding.  The low interest rates and the district’s positive financial situation and outlook 
meant that paying down the bonds over the next fifteen years would be relatively easy; 
even more importantly, however, the District, only a year old at the time, lacked any 
credit rating, and would thus have trouble securing future financing for larger projects.  
By tackling a smaller set of project, funding-wise, and making a move to acquire 
financing when the market was favorable, Central Health were able to receive a AAA 
rating from Standard and Poor’s, the highest credit rating possible, which will help them 
secure future financing on larger projects should they ever need it, while putting 
themselves at less financial risk in the future.
81
  Other new governments may seek bonds 
they otherwise would not need in similar situations. 
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Why Not Bonds? 
 Why would a local government choose to tax their own citizens rather than take 
out bonds?  The big reason there seems to be risk.  Raising taxes certainly carries a 
political risk to lawmakers; indebting the government poses an economic risk.  Defaults 
on municipal bonds are rare; as of 2007, Standard and Poor’s calculated that less than one 
percent of municipality bond offerings were defaulted on, compared to 13% of 
corporations bond offerings.  However, the economic times since then have changed, and 
bonds that fail to bring economic benefit can harm the city.  In 2011, both Jefferson 
County, Alabama and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania filed for bankruptcy, largely related to 
earlier defaults on bonds.  In fact, the defaults prior to 2000 were negligible compared to 
those that came after, thanks to economic downturns.  Thus, modern governments may 
see bonds as risky when other options exist.
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 Tying into this, credit ratings may make bond sales less profitable for a given 
government.  Investors see lower credit ratings as signs of risk, especially since lower 
ratings can reflect past defaults,
83
 and bond sellers must use higher interest rates to entice 
buyers.
84
  However, investors also consider factors beyond the local government in 
question; defaults, downgrades in credit ratings, and economic crisis in general in nearby 
governments can lower investor confidence in a government’s bonds, even if that 
government is traditionally solvent.  Detroit’s bankruptcy forced many local governments 
in Michigan to reconsider plans to sell bonds,
85
 even those whose credit ratings are 





 Taxes may also be preferable to bonds when the timing fails to favor a bond 
election.  As mentioned, multiple state constitutions limit the dates that elections can be 
held; this ranges from Georgia, where bonds can be included on four election dates each 
year,
87
 to Colorado, where the Tax Payer Bill of Rights limits most bond elections to 
November.
88
  If a given year is not conducive to a particular bond election, and the 
government has no options to schedule the election on an alternative date, a city may 
raise taxes slightly to buy time until a more appropriate election arrives, or else hold off 
on any projects that require additional funding. 
 Perceptions cut both ways; while raising taxes is politically risky, governments 
face hard sales when advocating debt for seemingly minor projects.  According to a 
former public finance banker of twenty years, an appropriate debt package generally 
requires at least one large item that the public universally recognizes as a public good – a 
new school, lane extensions, or a new firehouse, for example.  Without the larger item to 
rally the voters, smaller projects fall flat more easily; even essential projects can fail if 
they seem frivolous.  Thus, governments may favor higher taxes when lacking such a 
massive item. 
Failure of Bond Elections 
 Increased taxation no longer seems to be the solution to every need for additional 
revenue in general, but this information does not address specific instances when tax 
increases simply are not viable.  The contents of bond packages show how much certain 
items can cost, and how difficult it can be to actually raise that kind of money for a given 
district.  For example, Eanes ISD, a school district in Austin, Texas’ metropolitan area, 
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recently held a bond election which called for almost $90 million in construction and 
renovations, simultaneously proposing a tax increase that would average out to $10 in 
additional property taxes on $500,000 homes per month to pay for the bonds over time, 
or $125 additional dollars a year.
89
  However, the election in question failed. That leaves 
the question of how much the school district can pay for from the package out of tax 
revenue; the answer, apparently, is almost none of it.  The failure of the bond means that 
many of the projects, especially the major ones, will go unfunded.  The single largest 
item on the bond agenda, a new elementary school designated to replace an aging facility, 
was estimated to cost $38 million to build, from land purchase to completion of the 
building.
90
  That item is now completely off the table as far as the district is concerned, 
until a new bond can be passed in the future. 
 This raises the question of what happens when a bond election fails, which itself 
is important when attempting to judge how much fungibility the bonds actually provide.  
As mentioned above, the first option in the event of a bond failure is to reoffer a similar 
(but usually smaller) package in a following election.  This is generally simpler than 
calling for an initial election since most of the hard work has been done already; the 
district in question already has some kind of package set, and needs to simply determine 
what not to include in the new election.  In 2012, Austin city had seven bond measures on 
the ballot, leading to only one failure – a $78.3 million affordable housing bond.  The 
following year, after reworking the ballot language and lowering the measure to $65 
million, in conjunction with a stronger campaign by outside housing activists and weaker 
opposition, the city managed to get a similar bond package passed.
91
  While the new bond 
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obviously could not go as far as the initially desired measure, it still means that most of 
the planned projects will receive funding. 
 A second tactic, which is mainly a short-term one, involves using tax money to 
handle some of the smaller and more urgent matters.  This can involve raising taxes to 
create more revenue, or redistributing funding from elsewhere in the budget (usually the 
MNO portion).  For example, in the failed Eanes bond, the plan called for the 
replacement or renovation of HVCA units at six of the schools for a total cost of 
$10,000,000.
92
  Obviously, not all of those projects will receive funding; however, in 
Texas, proper HVAC functionality is considered an essential item.  The standard Austin 
apartment lease calls for emergency repair status with regards to any HVAC malfunction; 
when dealing with schools where students will spend a third of their day, it also seems 
likely that HVAC functionality is a top priority, meaning that at least some renovation of 
the systems will likely be funded in order of priority, especially where the replacements 
would cut down on future maintenance needs. Similarly, other small items that are 
considered important or essential may also be dealt with from the MNO budget.  
However, this leaves less money to pay school employees, including teachers, 
administrators, and maintenance staff.
 
 
 The final option is the one most contingent on outside factors.  As mentioned, 
bond money can be left over from previous elections.  Though this money is limited, so 
long as it falls within the 15% effective limit, this money can persist until it is spent.  
When a failed bond falls into an issue area that a previous bond with excess funds 
covered, those excess funds can be put to use in paying for items on the failed bond. 
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 Although it is mentioned last, this is usually the first option that lawmakers look 
to in order to find funding for a failed bond’s projects.  The leftover money from such 
bond sales is already being paid off in any event, so it makes sense to go ahead and use it 
if nothing has come up to that point.  Furthermore, this can be a way out of an unexpected 
over-sale of bonds, leaving a government with more money than can be spent, though 
such situations are rare.  However, as mentioned, leftover bond sales require a confluence 
of events in order to manifest as an option.  Firstly, there needs to have been a previous 
bond with leftover money, and that bond must fall into a category that can apply to the 
project in question.  Atlanta cannot redirect leftover transportation money into housing, 
nor can the Charlotte school district lend a city its leftover bond funds to help with 
utilities repair.  With single-issue districts, such as hospitals and schools, the bonds can 
generally be written so that they can apply to anything that that district may need in the 
future; but, for cities and counties, this means that failure to pass bonds repeatedly in a 
given issue area can lead to a lack of future funding for projects related to that issue. 
How Do the States Differ? 
 Up to now, this paper discussed the generalities of how the bond process works, 
and has presented some examples to answer the question of whether or not bonds are 
pursued to create fungibility for the governments in question.  The question itself may not 
be fully answered in the course of this work.  However, we can also begin looking at how 
the states – and the governments within states – vary with regards to their handling of 
bonds, such the laws that they put in place regarding bonds, as well as how they pursue 
the issues of taxation. 
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What These Cases Tell Us 
 I have outlined multiple different examples of how states approach bonds and 
debt, as well as how they approach taxes.  But the real question remains – what can these 
states tell us?  I devoted the time to these cases in order to outline a possible taxonomy 
with regards to measuring how states (and municipalities) handle bond issues.  In each 
case, I outline the state’s overall rules, and then detail those rules with regards to three 
categories – transparency, taxing authority, and freedom to pass bonds – and how these 
factors contribute to the choices for lawmakers exists in raising taxes or issuing bonds. 
 These states were not chosen randomly, but rather are a convenience sample 
based on available information.  The choices also represent the vast range of differences 
that the states can have regarding issues of bond and tax policy, ranging from Illinois’ 
freer home rule policies to the strictly-controlled policies of Alabama.  There may be 
more open or stricter policies; however, the ones presented appear to represent the 
various options along with spectrum. 
New Jersey 
 New Jersey is one of the smallest states in terms of area, but not only does it have 
the eleventh largest population of states in the nation, it also possesses an incredible 
population density, with approximately 1210 people per square mile of state area making 
it the densest state in the Union.
93****  This makes New Jersey a very interesting state to 
study with regards to public works projects and the funding for them – after all, there is 
very little area to make such works, and yet the state has a great deal of people using each 
                                                 
**** If New Jersey had that density and were the size of Texas, it would have a population almost as large 
as that of the entire United States. 
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and every service, meaning that they may require extensive renovations to keep up-to-
date. 
 At the state level, New Jersey collected $27 billion in tax and fee revenue in 2013, 
a growth of 6.8% from 2012.
94
  This comes to an approximate average of $3055 in taxes 
per capita.  In addition, local governments collected $2893 per person in property taxes, 
which ranks the highest in the nation, and which comes out to an additional $25 million 
in taxes collected by local entities.  With additional taxes from other sources, the per 
capita tax rate in New Jersey comes out to $6675, a tax burden of 12.27%.
95
 
 The New Jersey Department of Treasury maintains an Office of Public Finance, 
which keeps track of state debt
96
 – bonded debt accrued by legislative action, and by state 
agencies issuing their own independent bonds, as well as non-bonded debt and 
obligations that the state has accrued, such as pensions.  As part of this mission, the OPF 
publishes an annual report of the state’s debts, including the sources of debt (i.e. which 
bond issuances money is still owed on), how much the original debt was authorized at, 
and how much is still owed.  Unfortunately, the OPF does not keep track of local 
governments’ debts and bond obligations, and no other central authority seems to keep 
track of the lower governments’ debt, meaning deeper research into New Jersey will 
require looking at each city or other local entity on its own.
97
 
 This does not mean that the state level data cannot be useful, however.  For one 
thing, the report provides us with a glimpse into how the New Jersey Legislature views 
the purpose of bonds.  For example, we learn that New Jersey expects a State Capital 
Improvement Plan to be filed annually, which schedules future public works projects and 
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the bonds to pay for them, if any.  This suggests that the state annually seeks bonds, a 
fairly frequent undertaking.  In addition, we also learn that the state and state agencies 
have almost $35 billion in bonded debt that it owes as of June 2013, but that half of that 
debt is backed by “dedicated revenue,” meaning that they are likely revenue bonds.  Even 
so, the state still owes $1985 per person in general revenue-backed debt, and almost twice 
that for all bonded debt, far beyond what it takes in from taxes each year.  In addition, the 




 One further point of interest exists regarding New Jersey.  Not all states have to 
seek approval to pursue new state general obligation debt, though the practice is almost 
universal among lower levels of government.  However, in New Jersey, new debts greater 
than one percent of the annual budget must be approved by the voters.  Until 2008, this 
did not apply to bonds issued by state authorities that were autonomous of state and local 
governments, such as the New Jersey Transit Authority; these entities could “authority 
bonds,” which function similar to revenue bonds but which can be backed by general 
taxes rather than just the revenue generated by the agency.
99
  This changed after the 2008 
general election, however, when voters approved a constitutional amendment requiring 
voter approval for authority bonds which derive backing from state funding.  This 
provides a possible natural experiment to see if bonds from before and after this period 
are substantively different in scope.
100
 
 Very little information has been found as yet as to the overall limits on New 
Jersey’s local bond rules.  However, a great wealth of information exists regarding the 
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bonds from New Jersey Schools, thanks to the New Jersey School Boards Association, 
who provide a great deal of transparency for school bonds across the state, including rate 
of passage from year to year.  In addition, New Jersey requires that almost all school 
budgets be approved by the local voters, and the board keeps track of the information 
regarding those passages as well.
101
  Passage of bonds is not guaranteed by any stretch, 
and varies widely from year to year; in March 2012, for instance, voters in four 
townships rejected $23 million in construction projects, and only one $1 million request 
from Little Silver schools was approved (of which a quarter was already covered by an 
existing fund).
102




 Transparency: While it can be difficult to find viable local information, the State 
has at least set up its own website that details how it handles debt (and taxes).  
This, at least, allows some insight into how New Jersey functions. 
 Tax Income/Power: Though they may not be spending it properly at all times, 
New Jersey has a great deal of tax revenue to work with.  That said, New Jersey 
also has been missing the mark according to its own internal reports, meaning that 
it may have to rely more heavily on bonds in the future, but also raises questions 
as to whether or not the state can afford those bonds. 
 Bond Authority: New Jersey seems to have the ability to pass bonds without 
consulting voters, for the most part, and thus the only limit to the state’s debt is 
the government’s prudence.  Local governments, to the contrary, need to seek 
voter approval; if the passage rates on school bonds are any indication, many local 
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governments in New Jersey face a challenge in convincing voters to support their 
bonds.  This may become more difficult in some communities; Atlantic City, for 
instance, had its bond rating “junked” due to a weaker tax base, which will make 
it harder for the city to seek further bonds to try and revitalize the damage time 
and changes in the law have done.
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 Choice Points:  For local lawmakers, the main choice points regarding bonds are 
standard, as described through the paper – the choice to pursue bonds over taxes 
are not restricted by special state policies, and no outside factor seems to legally 
limit how much they can seek in bonds; thus, their choices are mostly based on 
local conditions.  However, certain areas have suffered due to the economic 
recession and damage from natural disasters, leaving their options more limited.  
In addition, the higher overall tax rates may stymie bond projects that require 
voter approval.  For the state, the choice points lie solely in the legislature, 
allowing them to act freely; state agencies must seek voter approval for certain 
types of bonds, which may influence how they seek financing (if they do at all). 
Illinois 
 Illinois’ average resident paid $4658 in taxes in 2011, with $1881 being property 
taxes.
105
  Illinois does not have a central database of bond information. 
 Illinois law creates two different classes of government.  Most local governments 
are required to abide by statutory limitations set by the state; however, certain Illinois 
governments bear the “home rule” designation.  Home rule cities (as well as Cook 
County) either passed a referendum to declare themselves home rule, or else 
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automatically received the designation by having more than 25,000 residents; these 
districts are constitutionally exempt from certain state laws, and can nullify the effects of 
county laws in the municipal borders.  This autonomy allows these municipalities to 
justify their own specific laws.
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 Transparency: Illinois offers no known database of bond information. 
 Tax Income/Power: Non-home rule local governments can be limited by the 
Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL), a law that allows referenda to 
limit the growth of overall property taxes to the growth in the CPI or 5%, 
whichever is greater.
107
  Not every local government has such a law, but every 
government that has put the referendum on the ballot has passed it. This limits 
local taxing authority.  Home-rule governments are not under any obligation to 
honor the PTELL; they can choose to cap their own taxes, but the city councils in 




 Bond Authority: Statutory restrictions limit non-home rule districts to a certain 
percentage of the Equalized Assessed Value (1/3 of the market value of all 
taxable property in that district) in outstanding principles, with the percentage 
based on the type of government.
109
 Home rule districts can be limited by the state 
government in special cases, but normally have free reign to seek bonds, and are 
only limited by city codes.
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 Choice Points: Most local governments must abide by voter-set limits with 
regards to taxation; this may influence the decision to pursue bonds, especially 
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when contrasted against a major tax increase.  However, home rule governments, 
as well as the state, only have to abide by statutory limits set by the body pursuing 
the bond.  This means that they have additional options when pursuing either 
taxes or bonds; if their local laws prevent the government from getting what it 
wants, said government can merely rewrite the laws without any direct check by 
the people. 
Alabama 
Alabama’s tax burden in 2011 was 8.3%, meaning that the average resident paid 
$2886 in state and local taxes, including $540 in local property taxes, the lowest property 
tax rate in the state.
111
  With 4.8 million residents, this means that the state and local 
governments collectively took in $13 billion dollars this past year.  Unfortunately, no 
central database exists to determine how much money Alabama owes in bonds, at either 
the state or local level. 
 Like many states, Alabama has, as part of its law, the authority to issue GO 
bonds.  However, this authority is not universal, nor is it statutory.  That is to say, it is not 
enough for the Alabama legislature to pass a law for a bond to come into existence, or 
even to call for a referendum.  Rather, it appears that the authority to issue state GO 
bonds must come from an amendment to the state’s 1901 constitution.  According to 
Section 213 of the constitution, the only debt that can be created by or against Alabama 
as a state are in times of invasion or insurrection, and even then only if two-thirds of both 
houses of the state legislature approve of it.  The only exceptions provided for in the 
constitution are that a maximum $300,000 loan can be negotiated by the governor with 
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legislative approval to “meet the deficiencies of the treasury,” with no future loans 
authorized until the initial one is not paid off, and bonds that are used to refund bonded 
debt held at the time the 1901 constitution was passed.
112
  Thus, in order for the state to 
enter into bonded debt, it must pass a constitutional amendment, which includes voter 
approval of the measure.  This does mean that we can determine the principles of all state 
bond sales, even if we cannot locate how much they still have left to pay on principle plus 
interest. 
Local governments (referred to collectively as “municipal corporations,” have 
standard restrictions set in the state constitution regarding the creation of debt – that is, 
any general obligation bonds passed must go through the voters for approval.  
Furthermore, the local governments are limited in how much debt they can create; all 
municipal corporations can have up to 20% of the assessed value of property inside their 
jurisdiction in debt, and those with a population of less than 6000 can have an additional 




I bring up Alabama in this to show a state on the far end of the spectrum from one 
such as New Jersey – low taxes, a smaller, less dense population, and a very different 
method for approving state bonds, even though local bonds function under very similar 
processes.  This could be viewed as an example at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
New Jersey, at least as far as the state-level matters go. 
 Transparency: We can discover which state bonds were ratified into the 
Constitution, and how much they initially were worth.  However, there is no easy 
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way as yet to determine how much is left on the bonds, and how much the 
localities serve 
 Tax Income/Power: It is uncertain if Alabama can draw on more taxes or if it 
chooses not to.  That said, they do also have a sizeable amount of wealth in recent 
years due to oil and natural gas in their Gulf Coast waters (or did prior to the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster) which constitutionally is used to pay for certain 
projects.
114
  Further, the Alabama Code limits how much tax each municipality 
and county can raise; a county cannot change its sales tax in either direction from 
what the law has set for it. 
 Bond Authority: The local governments have a standard form of passing bonds, 
but also have limits in place as to how much debt overall they are allowed.  The 
state government, on the other hand, must pass all bonded debt through amending 
the constitution, which not only requires consulting the public, but severely limits 
when they can seek these bonds.  It also means that the state must make these 
bond events even more public than it may normally; it is possible to miss a 
regular bond election in an odd-numbered year, but any amendments to the state 
constitution will be noticed on the ballot and by the voters. 
 Choice Points:  Alabama’s state government may have the strictest rules in the 
country for a state pursuing bond debt, and fairly strict rules for pursuing bonds 
locally as well.  The need to amend the constitution puts all bond debt in the 
hands of the voters, whether local or state, and may be preventing (or at least 
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discouraging) the governments of Alabama from pursuing significant levels of 
debt. 
Texas 
 Texas is currently the second largest state in both area and population, having 
passed New York in the 2010 Census.  Texas has no income tax, along with Alaska, 
Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming.  Conversely, however, the 
property tax owed per capita is $1557, and each person owes $3088 in taxes overall; 
while these values exceed states such as Illinois or New Jersey, the wealth disparity 
causes these taxes to represent relatively larger tax burdens (especially the property taxes, 
which are high for the property value).
115
  All told, the state took in $47 billion in taxes in 
2013, up 8.4% from the past year.
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 Texas appears to be unique in how well it tracks debt in the state.  The Texas 
Bond Review Board acts to track all bonded debt held by governments in Texas, 
including all local bonds, and including a breakdown of the original principle, how much 
has been paid thus far, and how much is owed (including interest).  The Review Board 
also makes known the general purpose for each bond offering, though it does not keep 
track of the specific uses of the bonds.
117
  The TBRB does not, however, act to regulate 
bond usage or elections (except for drafting rules for private activity bonds), but rather 
facilitates those entities that would seek to fund projects with bonds, and to educate them 
and the public as to the state of Texas’ debt.
118
  As previously mentioned, it is the 
Attorney General’s office that approves the election of new bonds in the state. 
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 The state of Texas itself owes $24 billion in GO bond debt,
119
 and $50 billion 
more in revenue bonds.
120
  Collectively, the local governments are $200 billion dollars in 
debt as of 2013.
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 Transparency: Texas is the only known state to maintain a database of bonds.  
Although the MSRB’s EMMA database records data from across the country, 
EMMA requires that you know the specific issuers you wish to learn about; you 
cannot filter EMMA for different types.
122
  Texas’ Bond Review Board, 
conversely, allows you to sort by different types of governments, allowing those 
curious to know about school debt in Texas to find out only about school bonds, 
and specifically the principle and remaining debt owed.  This makes Texas the 
most transparent state in the nation at present. 
 Tax Income/Power: Texas more than manages to stay solvent even without an 
income tax, but the overall tax revenue for the state is low relative to its size.  
That said, we also need to take into account the lack of professionalization in the 
state legislature; since the legislature meets very infrequently, the state may not 
carry out as many projects relative to the local governments as in other states.  
Conversely, the limits on taxes make it harder for local governments to raise 
revenue through alternative means.  That said, if a government has room to 
increase its taxes up to the tax cap, they can pursue such increases without asking 
for permission, meaning that frugal districts have more options in the future. 
 Bond Authority: Texas is one of the few states where a state figure approves all 
bonds; for the local governments, this puts an extra burden to justify the need for 
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the bonds, as well as the financial conditions in that jurisdiction.  The local 
governments are also bound by rules limiting how much they can tax, and thus 
how much they can reasonably bond at a time. 
 Choice Points: Texas’ system resembles the traditional system regarding taxes 
and bonds throughout the nation, with one major difference- the involvement of 
the attorney general means that local governments have an additional actor to 
consider in their plans.  No statistics are given regarding rejection by the attorney 
general’s office, but this may reflect more careful planning on the part of the 
governments seeking to issue debt – they are not rejected because the packages in 
question are well-constructed.  The added role of a state figure does not seem to 
keep local governments from issuing a large quantity of bonds, as Texas 
perennially ranks among the top bond issuers by amount. 
Future Research Questions 
 This project only scratches the surface regarding research into bonds.  Many other 
issues remain; while some qualitative analysis has been done regarding the effects of 
different laws on bond issues, more in-depth research can be conducted regarding the 
effects of particular types of policies and governing situations.  In-depth research into the 
latitude offered to different types of local governments, the effects of greater autonomy 
on the choice to pursue debt, and the effects of bonds on the economic growth of 
governments represent three potential avenues of future research. 
 However, the largest research issue remains the problem of data; without 
comprehensive information on bond issuances and bond policies for each state, any such 
49 
 
research faces limitations.  For the latter, research may only require a few dedicated 
individuals examining state constitutions and codes in-depth to develop a road map on 
bond policies.  However, the removal of relevant data from the available datasets after the 
maturation of bonds means that researchers cannot completely analyze the fiscal impacts 
of past bonds with ease.  Even if scholars began cataloging EMMA’s records completely 
from tomorrow forward, the data in question would only include bonds which are not yet 
mature, missing decades of bond issues by local and state governments and agencies.  In 
order to build a fully comprehensive record, one of two things must happen.  The first, 
and best situation, would be to receive from the SEC all bond information, whether 
currently listed in EMMA or not.  This data may require significant organization, but the 
data would be there to be organized. 
 However, if the SEC cannot or will not provide such data, researchers face a 
daunting challenge.  The only possibility of success would require a coordinated effort by 
political scientists and policy analysts from around the nation examining all local bond 
sales, city by city, county by county, and government by government, until the full scope 
of bonds stands revealed.  Such a task may require multiple academics from each state, 
and would take years, but it may be the only way to build the database necessary. 
Conclusion 
 As with the proverbial iceberg, we only see the smallest portion of the role bonds 
play in politics, and the role of politics in the decisions to pursue bonds.  However, this 
examination does bring to light the importance of understanding bonds and all the 
elements of society they touch upon – which may well be every part society.  Bonds are 
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not simply ballot items put to the voters for approval or rejection; they evolve from 
months of research and preparation, and often represent a political risk on the part of the 
decision-makers.  They also represent what many would consider an essential part of our 
public works funding, a component of government resources without which development 
would be impossible. 
 The political decisions to seek bonded debt vary from state to state and situation 
to situation; however, many of the issues remain constant even across divergent cases.  
Tax limitations, both legal and practical, prevent governments from taxing their way out 
of every desire for appropriations or discretionary spending.  Public approval can 
influence not only whether a bond passes, but whether it hits the ballot.  And the data 
needed to fully study this issue remains uncollated, though it may well exist. 
 Bonds represent risk to society, in the form of debts our future generations must 
pay; they also represent the possibility that such a generation may enjoy benefits greater 
than the past could provide on its own, and that it may be in a better position to pay those 
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